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According  to  a  recent  report  of  the  European  Monitoring 
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia on Muslims in Europe, policies 
and public discourse on Islam and experiences of discrimination and 
social  and  economic  marginalization  in  the  last  five  years  have 
negatively impacted on Muslim immigrants’ sense of belonging to the 
host countries (Choudhury et al. 29). This is also true for the Turkish
1 
immigrants in the Netherlands among whom only a small percentage 
(12 %) regard themselves as being part of Dutch society (FORUM 
Factbook  on  the  Position  of  Muslims  in  the  Netherlands  16).  An 
important reason for the immigrants’ sense of exclusion is the public 
discourse on Islam and their stigmatization as Muslims. As a matter of 
fact, the public discourse in the Netherlands on Islam, as expressed in 
newspapers  and  magazines  in  the  post-September  11  context  and 
especially after the murder of the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004, 
often  reflects  a  xenophobia  imbued  with  anti-Islamism.  Different 
groups are in this popular discourse lumped together as the possessors 
of a homogeneous “Muslim culture” and the causes of their problems 
are looked for in “Islam” often reduced to the text of the Koran and 
sometimes to a specific interpretation of the text by an imam (Peters; 
Sunier and van Kuijeren 148). The “Islamization of the immigrants” 
in the words of Sunier and van Kuijeren ignores the complex interplay 
between ethnic and religious identity as well as the possibility that 
                                                 
* Dr., Frei Universiteit, Modern Türkiye Tarihi. 
1 “Turkish” here refers to those immigrants from Turkish origins and who consider 
themselves as Turks regardless of their ethnic background.  
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ethnicity  can  be  a  more  important  marker  of identity  than religion 
(Choudhury et al. 26).  
The experience of the Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands 
mirrors  the  complex  relationship  between  ethnic  and  religious 
identities as well the coexistence of diverse religious formations in the 
country of origin. However, generational changes of the immigrants 
or, political changes in their country of origin, as pointed at by Avcı, 
can  “redefine” the  relationship towards their  country  of  origin  and 
lead  to  a  “rapprochement”  between  different  Turkish-Islamic 
communities in the Netherlands (210). This article aims to shed light 
on the historical formation of the heterogeneous Turkish Islam in the 
Netherlands  and  new  trends  affecting  it,  on  the  basis  of  previous 
research and personal communications conducted in June 2008.  
The  first  generation  of  Turkish  immigrants  were  labor 
migrants who came to the Netherlands on the basis of an agreement 
which was signed by the Dutch and Turkish governments in 1964. 
Turkish migrants who came from villages in the Central Anatolia and 
the Black Sea Region were mostly settled in cities such as Rotterdam, 
Amsterdam, Utrecht. Although the official demand for unskilled labor 
stopped in 1974, the migration from Turkey continued with family 
reunification  programs  and  with  the  political  refugees  who  came 
during the 1980s. Today, Dutch citizens who have Turkey as their 
country of origin constitute 2,27 % of the population (372. 714 out of 
16.405.399  in  2008  according  to  the  online  publication  of  the 
Statistics  Netherlands
2).  Turkish  immigrants  range  from  atheists  to 
pious practitioners of Sunni Islam who are organized around several 
                                                 
2 Figure: “Population by origin and generation,” 1 January 2008. Available online at 
http://statline.cbs.nl.  
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Islamic  associations  and  mosques.
3  Currently,  from  among  453 
mosques  in  the  Netherlands,    245  belong  to  these  Turkish 
organizations  (FORUM  Factbook  15).  There  are  also  non-Sunni 
immigrant groups of either Turkish or Kurdish ethnic origin, namely 
Alevites  who  distance  themselves  from  these  mosque-centered 
formations.
4  This  coexistence  of  different  Turkish  “Islams”  in  the 
Netherlands reflects the plurality of Islam in Turkey.  
 
Islam in Turkey 
The debate on Islam in the Netherlands concerns the issue of 
integration of Muslim immigrants, which include Turks along with 
other ethnic groups. In Turkey, however, Islam is often on the agenda 
as a problem in relation to secularism. In Turkey, radical Islamism is 
seen  as  the  major  threat  for  secularism,  the  central  principle  of 
Kemalism which is the founding ideology of the Republic. This is at 
least the perception of the military which sees the guardianship of the 
secular regime as its essential duty, even at the expense of democracy 
if  necessary.  The  military  leadership  today,  however,  instead  of 
interfering in democracy with overt coups as it did lastly in 1980, acts 
together with the state’s juridical organs, the mainstream press and 
civil society organizations supporting secularism in order to block the 
actions  of  allegedly  anti-secularist  political  actors.  The  latter, 
according to the military, are hiding themselves behind the new vision 
                                                 
3 Mosques in the Netherlands have been functioning as community centers even for 
ideological groups for whom religion is not the main focus, as in the case of several 
mosques which are bases of the so-called ülkücüs (idealists) or extreme nationalist 
associations who are the followers of Alparslan Türke  (d. 1997) (Landman 218). 
4 Four Turkish organizations which represent different Sunni groups take part within 
the CMO (Contactorgaan Moslems en de Overheid) which is the official consultative 
organ  on  issues  related  to  integration  since  its  recognition  by  the  government  on 
November 1, 2004. Turkish Alevi organizations who were exluded in the set-up phase 
of this organ established with other non-Sunni groups the CGI (Contact Groep Islam) 
which was recognized on January 13, 2005 (Euro-Islam Info, 5).   
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of “conservative democracy” adopted by the Justice and Development 
Party  (JDP),  the  governing  party  which  had  its  second  landslide 
electoral victory in July 2007.
5  
This picture of a polarized Turkey divided between the JDP 
supported by Muslim masses versus the secular state overshadows the 
real dynamics of Islam in Turkey and its complex interaction with the 
state.  Such  a  picture  does  not  help  a  better  understanding  of  the 
dynamics of Islam among the Turks living in the Netherlands either. A 
short account of Islam in Turkey which can be summarized as the 
coexistence  of  the  state-controlled  Islam  with  a  multi-faceted 
unofficial parallel Islam in a secular political setting might, however, 
facilitate a better analysis of the recent dynamics in both countries. 
It is true that in the 1920s, the founding cadres of the Republic 
led  by  Mustafa  Kemal  Atatürk  accelerated  the  process  of 
secularization  and  Westernization  from  the  top  down  with  radical 
reforms  unprecedented  in  the  Islamic  world.  The  state-imposed 
secularization in the fields of education, law and culture under the 
single-party regime (1923-1945) created a gap between the urban elite 
having  access  to  these  fields  and  the  masses  who  were  largely 
illiterate. Besides, as Mardin stated, except for a minority, the secular 
official  ideology  of  Kemalism  could  not  play  the  role  of  a  rival 
ideology  vis-à-vis  Islam  nor  did  it  let  other  ideological  currents 
challenge religion (Mardin 149). However, not all the bridges were 
                                                 
5  The  last  press  declaration  of  the  Turkish  military,  the  so-called  “e-muhtıra”  (e-
memorandum) was released on its webpage on 27 April 2007, when the National 
Assembly  failed  to  vote  for  a  president.  The  memorandum  expressed  the 
“disturbance” (endi e) of the military concerning the debates on secularism during the 
presidential election process and declared its commitment to protect Turkey’s secular 
system. The text of the memorandum is available online at the Turkish Military’s web 
site:  http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/ 
10_1_Basin_Aciklamalari/2007/BA_08.html  
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broken between the state and the society. Islam continued to be one of 
these bridges. 
The Kemalist political elite eradicated the Ottoman sultanate 
and its basis of legitimacy, the Caliphate, and removed Islam from the 
public sphere by closing Islamic schools, courts and Sufi brotherhood. 
However, their aim was not to establish atheism. Like the Ottoman 
state, the Republican regime integrated and subordinated Islam to the 
requirements  of  the  state  while  keeping  Islam  under  control  and 
preventing opposition from using it as a rival ideology. A state organ 
for administering religion was established in 1924 under the name of 
the Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA). The latter, under direct 
supervision of the Prime Minister, appointed imams, preachers and 
supervised müftüs as well as centrally distributing the Friday sermons 
to the mosques throughout the country (up until 2006). The PRA’s 
main function was to promote a national, rational and private Islam, 
loyal  to  the  secular  state,  as  opposed  to  what  the  state  framed  as 
foreign,  superstitious,  political  and  reactionary  Islam.  Hence, 
secularism (in Turkish lâiklik > from French laïcité), the pillar of the 
Kemalist ideology protected by the Constitution since 1937, has been 
marked  by  the  state’s  control  over  religion  rather  than  a  complete 
institutional separation between the two.  
After the transition to competitive multi-party politics in 1946 
the state’s control  over  Islam  in  public  began to  loosen  and  Islam 
began to serve as a means of political mass mobilization (Toprak 124). 
All  right-wing  political  parties  which  took  power  since  the  1950s 
emphasized the freedom of conscience and their respect to people’s 
religious values. As stated by Mert, none of these parties questioned 
the  principle  of  secularism  or  the  control  of  religion  by  the  state 
through the PRA. What they did was to criticize the neglect of the  
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spiritual sphere during the single-party period. To remedy this neglect, 
new theology faculties and preachers’ schools have been established 
by subsequent center-right governments to supply the people’s need 
for “enlightened men of religion.”  
This  official  state  Islam  was,  however,  could  never 
monopolize the religious sphere. With the relative liberalization of the 
political and cultural spheres, the increasing levels of education and 
the social mobility in the context of multi-party democracy, a political 
struggle  over  the  definition  and  reformulation  of  what  is  national, 
Islamic,  as  well  as  the  meaning  of  secularism  began.  Despite  the 
continuing legal restrictions on Islamic formations out of the control 
of the PRA, a heterogeneous and unofficial parallel Islam coexisted in 
opposition to and sometimes intermingling with the official, Sunni and 
apolitical Islam of the PRA (Zarcone 272; 306-7). This plural nature 
of the Turkish Islam has been exported to Europe too via Turkish 
immigrants who have settled there in big numbers from the mid-1960s 
onwards. 
An  important  stream  in  this  parallel  Islam  has  been  the 
Turcoman-Kızılba   Islam  of  neither  Sunni  nor  Shiite  Alevites  who 
used  to  survive  within  endogamous  and  isolated  communities  in 
Anatolia for centuries vis-à-vis the dominance of the Sunni political 
center  and  who  mostly  supported  the  Kemalist  regime  and  its 
secularization  program.
6  Another  important  stream  of  the  parallel 
Islam  is  that  of  Sufi  brotherhoods  which  had  a  problematic 
                                                 
6  Alevites,  who  have  traditionally  inhabited  rural  Central  and  Eastern  Anatolian 
provinces and have largely migrated to large industrialized cities of Western Turkey, 
comprise 15 to 30 % of the total population of Turkey. The intellectual elite of the 
urbanized Alevites began to be outspoken about their belief in the intellectual and the 
political arena from the 1960s onwards and questioned the Sunni bias of the PRA. 
However,  Alevism  has  only  recently  been  recognized  by  the  latter  as  an  Islamic 
belief. There is, however, also a big controversy over the definition of Alevism as to 
whether it should be regarded as being within or out of Islam, as a religion, or a 
secular worldview and philosophy.   
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relationship with the Kemalist regime because they were banned in 
1925.  
The Ottoman ulema (doctors of Islamic law regulating justice 
and education) lost their already diminished power with the closure of 
the Islamic schools and courts by the Republican state. Nevertheless, 
the  transfer  of  Islamic  knowledge  continued  with  the  clandestine 
activity of Sufi brotherhoods. Among the latter the Naqshbandiya was 
the most effective.
7 The most influential Sufi groupings which were 
also  effective  among  Turkish  immigrants  in  Europe  have  emerged 
from  within  this  order:  Đskender  Pa a  Cemaati  who  are  led  by 
Mehmed  Zahid  Kotku  (followed  by  his  son-in-law  Esad  Co an,  d. 
2001);  Nurcular,  led  by  Bediüzzaman  Said  Nursî  (d.  1960), 
Süleymancılar;  led  by  Süleyman  Hilmi  Tunahan  (d.  1959),  etc. 
(Zarcone 306-7). Because the ban on forming Sufi orders has been in 
force throughout the Republican period, zikir, repetitive recital of the 
name  of  God,  the  central  traditional  practice  of  a  Sufi  order  like 
Naqshbandiya, has been replaced by social gatherings for reading and 
discussing commentaries of the Koran and the hadith (Zarcone 276). 
This  new  Sufi  Islam  has  been  organized  as  communities  (cemaat) 
which are hierarchically organized under their sheikh (Zarcone 281). 
Süleymancı community led by Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, for example, 
has focused since 1949 on Koran courses as alternative to the state-
controlled courses and from mid-1960s onwards organized in larger 
scale (Zarcone 282; Yavuz 145-49).  
                                                 
7 The Naqshbandi order, which took its name from Sheikh Baha ud-Din Naqshband of 
Bukhara (d. 1390), was introduced in the Ottoman Empire in the 15
th century and had 
an increasing influence under with the Mawlana Khalid Baghdadi (d. 1827) all over 
Anatolia. The order is characterized by “its concern for the integrity of the Shari‘a” 
and “for the replacement of adat - customary law - by ordinances of the Shari‘a in 
several places” (Algar 14-15). The intellectual elite of the urbanized Alevites began to 
be outspoken about their belief in the intellectual and the political arena from the 
1960s onwards and questioned the Sunni bias of the PRA.  
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The  Nurcu  community  or  the  disciples  of  Said  Nursî  have 
been organized around dershanes, which are reading groups led by 
seniors who studied Risale-i Nur, Said Nursî’s commentaries of the 
Koran (Yavuz 151). It was in these “textual communities” that Said 
Nursî spread his own version of science, which, unlike positivism, 
reconciled faith and science, and approached scientific discoveries as 
revelations of the depth of the Koran’s message (Yavuz 159-60, 163-
64). After Said Nursi’s death, the Nurcu movement was fragmented 
into several groups. Among them, a  group under the leadership of 
Fethullah Gülen (1938-), who was a preacher and a disciple of Said 
Nursi, increased its influence in the 1980s. Gülen distanced himself 
from the wider Nurcu network by accommodating with the secularist 
military  and  bureaucratic  elite,  by  internationalizing  its  nationalist 
Islamic mission in the Turkic Muslim world and lastly even to African 
countries (Turam 359). Currently, his movement is the largest Islamic 
movement in Turkey, with numerous schools, universities, companies 
and  media  outlets  throughout  the  world.  As  stated  by  Turam,  his 
followers voted always for conservative central right parties, the last 
of which is the JDP, with whom they display similar attitudes, such as 
rejection of radical Islam and dialogue with the United States and the 
European Union. 
The parallel Islam has intermingled with the official Islam via 
the  cadres  who  infiltrated  into  Republic’s  schools  of  preachers, 
theology faculties and the PRA (Zarcone 307). For instance, it was 
Süleymancıs who trained and employed preachers for the PRA until 
the latter began to employ only the graduates of official Preachers’ 
schools and Theology Faculties in 1965 (Gözaydın 223). Moreover, 
parallel Islam was also an important player in the political sphere. The 
Naqshbandi order played a crucial role in the establishment of the first  
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major Islamic party in Turkey. The National Order Party (Milli Nizam 
Partisi) was founded in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan (1926-) with the 
encouragement  of  the  Naqshbandi  Sheikh  Mehmet  Zaid  Kotku  (d. 
1980) (Çakır 22). Erbakan’s political ideology formulated under the 
name of Milli Görü  (National Viewpoint) envisioned an economic 
development  based  on  industrialization,  but  rejected  Westernist 
cultural  modernization  by  stressing  the  importance  of  “morals  and 
virtue”  and  Islamic  values,  and  basing  the  national  pride  on  the 
“glorious” Ottoman/Islamic past. This Islamic and nationalist ideology 
appealed to small traders and low income groups from rural areas or 
peripheries  of  metropolitan  areas  who  felt  like  their  economic 
situation  as  well  as  their  religious  and  cultural  values  to  be  under 
attack  (ibid.).  Milli  Görü   became  also  an  important  religious 
movement  among  Turkish  immigrants  in  Europe,  including  the 
Netherlands. Erbakan’s successive political parties were disbanded in 
1972 (National Order Party) and in 1980 (National Salvation Party, 
Milli  Selamet  Partisi)  after  the  military  interventions.  The  Welfare 
Party  (WP,  Refah  Partisi)  was  the  new  party  of  the  Milli  Görü  
movement between 1983 and 1998. The current Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan was active in the latter especially in the 1990s. The 
WP, which became the senior member of the coalition government in 
1996, was closed by the Constitutional Court in 1998 as it was seen as 
a threat to the secular character of the Republic (Cizre and Çınar). The 
WP was replaced this time by the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi), which 
was again closed down in 2001 for its anti-secular activities.  
After  the  closure  of  the  Virtue  Party,  the  movement  was 
divided into two between the traditionalists and the reformists. The 
reformists  founded  the  Justice  and  Development  Party  (JDP)  on 
August 14, 2001 and elected Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the prominent  
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ex-mayor  of  Istanbul,  as  their  leader.  These  reformists  under  the 
leadership  of  Erdoğan  have  been  critical  of  the  political  style  and 
policies of the WP and began to build a dialogue with non-Islamic 
sectors of the society. They have criticized and even rejected their 
Islamist past by adopting a new political discourse under the name of 
“conservative  democracy”;  avoided  their  earlier  anti-Westernist 
outlook;  and  accepted  economic  liberalism.  They  have  defended  a 
consensus-seeking politics, and broadened the party’s support base. 
Since  November  2002,  they  have  been  the  governing  party  and 
repeated  and  even  increased  their  electoral  success  in  July  2007. 
Despite the opposition of the military and the masses who protested 
the JDP  government’s alleged  Islamist  agenda of  overthrowing  the 
secular  regime  in  the  big  cities  of  the  country,  Abdullah  Gül,  the 
second man of the JDP, was elected by the Grand National Assembly 
as the President of the Republic. Gül became the first president whose 
wife wears an Islamic headscarf which is considered by the secularist 
establishment  to  be  a  symbol  of  radical  Islamism,  and  hence 
unacceptable  within  state  institutions.  However,  it  was  not  this 
development but the government’s attempt to amend the constitutional 
law in order to enable “covered” students to legally study in university 
campuses resulted in the current situation (as of June 2008) where the 
JDP is tried by the Constitutional Court on the charges of undermining 
secularism. 
 
Islam among Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands 
The  first  generation  of  Turkish-Muslim  immigrants  in  the 
Netherlands operated in an alien environment and made their best to 
carve their own spaces in it by clinging onto their religion. As their 
stay in the Netherlands was conceived as transitory, the orientation of  
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the  first  Turkish  migrant  organizations  was  towards  Turkey  rather 
than the host country. Accordingly, these organizations reflected the 
political  and  religious  cleavages  in  the  home  country  (Avcı  205). 
Gradually  the  plural  Turkish  Islam  was  reproduced  in  the  Dutch 
setting in such a way that the Sunni Islam of the PRA coexisted with 
parallel  Islam.
8  However,  Turkish  Islam  in  the  Netherlands  is  also 
shaped by local factors such as the Dutch legal system, institutional 
structure and experiences as migrants in the Dutch society (Sunier, 
Islam and Ethnicity, 155, 161). Although the ideological roots of the 
first organizations were in Turkey, the legal and historical conditions 
in the Dutch context have gradually made them less dependent on the 
social and political dynamics in the home country. The first Turkish-
Muslim  organizations  also  fitted  in  the  system  of  religious 
pillarization which organized politics, media, welfare, sports, schools 
and even economics according to religious denomination in the Dutch 
society in the 20th century. Interestingly, as stated by Rath, Sunier and 
Meyer, the establishment of Islamic institutions began in a gradually 
“de-pillarized”  society  due  to  the  increasing  secularization  of  the 
Dutch  society  since  the  1960s.  Away  from  the  restrictions  of  the 
Turkish  state,  these  immigrant  organizations  could  freely  conduct 
their activities and spread their ideas (Landman 219). The principle of 
equality concerning religious communities guaranteed by the Dutch 
Constitution of 1983 provided the Turkish immigrants with “the legal 
and political leverage to demand equal treatment and, in some cases, 
extra  provisions  in  order  to  be  able  to  catch  up  with  established 
                                                 
8 Another important constituent of the parallel Islam in the Netherlands is the Alevite 
groups  who  distance  themselves  from  all  the  Sunni  groups  –either  linked  to  the 
Diyanet and to other parallel Sufi formations. Alevites are organized in 16 different 
associations linked to the Federation of Alevite and Bekta i Associations (Federatie 
van  Alevitische  en  Bektashistische  verenigingen,  HAK-DER),  which  unite  the 
Alevites and Bekta is under its umbrella.   
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denominations”  (Sunier  and  van  Kuijeren,  145).  This  legal  and 
institutional framework combined with the community initiative was 
crucial for the existence of these Turkish-Islamic organizations.
9  
From the mid-1970s onwards, as family reunions increased 
and the children of immigrants began to be educated in Dutch schools, 
the  option  of  returning  to  Turkey  began  to  disappear:  Many 
immigrants preferred the much more convenient living conditions in 
the Netherlands. Hence, as pointed at by Canatan as well as by Sunier 
(Islam and Interest Struggle), a major shift occurred from the 1980s 
onwards in the leadership profiles and in the roles of the organizations 
within the Turkish community: Generational change was accompanied 
with  a  new  orientation  towards  the  host  country.  The  community-
centered,  introvert,  traditional  understanding  of  Islam  of  the  first 
generation  began  to  be  replaced  by  a  new,  individual,  secular  and 
pluralist understanding of Islam compatible with the modern trends.  
This  transformation  of  Turkish-Islamic  organizations  was 
facilitated by the Dutch authorities’ increasing concern for integration 
of  immigrant  groups.  The  observation  of  Sunier  and  van  Kuijeren 
sheds light on this process: “Islamic organizations were considered 
important to immigrant identity, and their activities were judged in 
terms  of their  function in  the  process  of  integration.  Organizations 
could now apply for subsidies to develop activities for their rank-and-
file  members,  provided  these  activities  sustained  the  integration 
process” (148). The sensitivity of Social-Democrats and Liberals on 
the  issue  of  integration  helped  Turkish-Islamic  organizations  in 
                                                 
9 As also stated in a recent report on Islam in the EU published by the European 
Parliament,  external  relationships  of  the  immigrant  organizations  and  their 
contribution  is  secondary  compared  with  the  financial  and  community  effort 
generated by the immigrants themselves (Dassetto et al. 9). The research of Rath et al. 
conducted in the cities of Rotterdam or Utrecht concluded the same by showing that 
external factors such as “foreign powers and international Muslim organizations have 
played only a limited role in the process of institutionalization” (191).  
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participating  in  public  life  and  in  receiving  subsidies  for  their 
initiatives.  In  the  course  of  years,  members  of  Turkish-Islamic 
immigrant organizations have become more and more active in local 
politics.
10  In  Sunier’s  words,  the  second  and  third  generation 
leadership  of  Islamic  organizations  “is  trying  to  alter  them  from 
organizations for Muslims into organizations of Muslims” (Islam and 
Interest Struggle, 49).  
 
Parallel Islam in the Netherlands: 
The first Muslim association for Turkish Muslim migrants in 
the Netherlands was founded in 1971 and registered as Vereniging ter 
behartiging van de belangen van moslims in Nederland (Association 
for the Promotion of the interests of Muslims in the Netherlands). This 
was followed by the Stichting Islamistisch Centrum Nederland (SICN, 
Foundation  Islamic  Center  in  the  NL)  which  was  established  in 
Utrecht in 1972. These were private initiatives for organizing prayer 
meetings  and  Koran  lessons  for  children  (Van  Bommel  127).  The 
SICN was established by a group named by other Turkish groups as 
“Süleymancıs,”  because  they  were  linked  to  the  followers  of 
Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan in Turkey. Though critical of the secular 
regime in Turkey, Süleymancıs in the Netherlands stayed away from 
active politics and restricted themselves as in Turkey to the teaching 
of Koran (Landman 217). While their activity was clandestine in the 
Turkish  context  where  the  Koran  courses  had  to  be  under  the 
supervision of the Diyanet (PRA), in Europe they could legally and 
freely survive and develop their community.  
                                                 
10 See, for instance, the article by Landman and Wessels for civil activism of the 
Turkish  (and  Moroccan)    organizations  in  the  process  of  bargaining  with  local 
municipalities for building new mosques, as well as the research of Rath et al. (111-
199).  
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As stated by van Bruinessen, Süleymancıs used to be known 
as an introvert community restricting themselves to purely religious 
activities. However, in the last years this seems to have changed. The 
group’s main activity is still to organize student dormitories and give 
Turkish children Islamic education. The association has been going 
through  a new phase under the leadership of the new chairman, Fikri 
Demirta ,  who  is  a  second  generation  Turk  educated  in  the 
Netherlands. Members of 91 Süleymancı organizations which include 
not only mosque organizations (48 mosques) but also women’s and 
youth branches have been in the last years engaging in community 
projects  and  activities  promoting  integration  of  immigrants  in  the 
Netherlands. The community celebrated last year the 35
th anniversary 
of their organization by publishing a booklet and organizing a cultural 
festival in Utrecht.  
Another  community  which  has  been  organized  in  the 
Netherlands  also  around  mosques  since  1975  is  the  Milli  Görü  
(National  Viewpoint)  group.  The  Milli  Görü   in  the  Netherlands 
which began to organize in Rotterdam in 1975 was an extension of the 
Islamist  political  movement  led  by  Necmettin  Erbakan  in  Turkey. 
Associations  linked  to the  Milli  Görü   group are not  only  mosque 
associations but also women’s and youth associations which organize 
cultural or educational activities within the mosques or other places. 
Via  activities  such  as  conferences,  language  courses  or  cultural 
festivals, celebrating and exhibiting or performing what they consider 
as  the  Turkish-Islamic  art  and  culture,  Milli  Görü   organizations 
ensure  their  internal  cohesion  as  well  as  taking  part  in  the  public 
space. These activities are also major events which promote women’s 
access to the public sphere and let them develop their organizational 
skills. The leaders of the Milli Görü  act as intermediaries between the  
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Dutch  society  and  their  communities  by  taking  part  in  public 
discussions  on  Islam  or  the  problems  related  to  migrants  (Sunier, 
Islam  and  Interest  Struggle,  46).  In  1997,  the  Milli  Görü   in  the 
Netherlands was divided into two regional organizations: the southern 
(Nederlandse  IslamitischeFederatie,  NIF)  and  northern  branches 
(Milli  Görü   Nederland).  Unlike  the  leadership  of  MG  Northern 
Netherlands (MGN) who often represent themselves in the media as 
democratic Muslims integrated in society, the NIF is more cautious 
and passive in terms of media appearance.  
As hinted by Avcı, at least at the leadership level, the regional 
separation of the MG reflects the ideological bifurcation of the MG 
movement in Turkey (206, 209). The leaders of the MGN do their best 
to  manage  the  image  of  their  organization  as  a  promoter  of 
multiculturalism and integration, in a manner similar to the leaders of 
the JDP in Turkey who have distanced themselves from the earlier 
Islamist  discourse  of  the  MG  parties  and  have  stressed  their 
commitment  to  democracy.  The  president  of  the  NIF,  Mehmet 
Yaramı lı,  on  the  other  hand,  clearly  expresses  his  organization’s 
continuing commitment to the founding ideology of Erbakan. In his 
view, the liberal orientation of the JDP and its cooperation with the 
global political and economic order occur at a cost: the loss of the 
identity of MG.
11  
Nevertheless it can be too quick to conclude that the North-
South division within the MGN reflects the split of the MG in Turkey 
between  Erbakan  and  Erdoğan  (JDP).  The  current  leaders  of  the 
MGN, like Canan Uyar, the president of the Women’s Federation of 
the MG North Netherlands (Stichting Vrouwenfederatie Milli Görü  
                                                 
11  Personal  communication  on  13  June  2008  at  the  Đskender  Pa a  Mosque  in 
Rotterdam.  
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Noord Nederland), are clearly different from the earlier generation in 
terms of their internalization of the democratic culture and their focus 
on the Dutch politics rather than merely Turkish one. However, in the 
words of Uyar, they are still “Erbakancıs” (supporters of Erbakan) in 
the sense that they respect and are proud of the founding fathers of 
their organization.
12 
Besides the members of the MG North Netherlands, currently 
the  most  active  Turkish-Muslim  group  in  the  Netherlands  is 
“Fethullahçılar,”  named  after  their  leader  Fethullah  Gülen.  The 
followers  of  Gülen  are  organized  not  around  mosques  but  around 
reading circles focusing on Said Nursi’s commentaries of the Koran or 
on  the  more  accessible  speeches  of  Gülen.  As  Yavuz  states,  the 
dershanes,  places  where  these  reading  groups  meet  serve  several 
purposes such as disseminating information, finding jobs, and forming 
diverse social networks etc. As elsewhere, Gülen’s followers in the 
Netherlands are active especially in the field of education and media. 
Via their association, Stichting Witte Tulp (founded in 1997), which 
has branches in several cities they organize extra-curricular support 
for  immigrant  students  in  order  to  help  them  increase  their 
performance in their schools. The Cosmicus Institute and its affiliated 
college  in  Rotterdam,  another  successful  initiative  of  the  Gülen 
movement, attracts third generation Turks from several backgrounds, 
even from the MG community which usually attend Islamic schools.
13 
The  circulation  of  the  weekly  Turkish  newspaper  Zaman  Hollanda 
                                                 
12 Personal communication on 12 June 2008 in Amsterdam. 
13 In the Netherlands, there are 37 Islamic primary schools and one secondary school 
in Rotterdam, which are recognized and financed by the state. Islamic primary schools 
entitled to full government funding and aiming at “improve the achievement levels of 
the pupils and to transmit Islamic identity.” The courses offered follow a national 
curriculum, while a few hours per week are allotted to week religious lessons and 
ceremonies. A recent research comparing the pupils at Islamic schools and with the 
schools with a similar pupil population could hardly find any differences between the 
two (Driessen and Valkenberg 23; Shadid, W and Van Koningsveld).  
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reaches 10.000, while its monthly Dutch version, Zaman Nederland, 
which addresses mainly the 2nd and 3rd generations of Turks has a 
circulation number of up to 50.000.
14 Alaaddin Erdal, the director of 
the  Stichting  Time  Media  Group  (founded  in  2005  in  Rotterdam) 
which publishes these newspapers, claims that the ideological borders 
between  the  communities  have  been  erased  and  that  although 
communities  continue  to  exist  on  the  surface,  in  the  last  years, 
dialogue  replaced  ideological  clashes  and  individual  rivalries.  He 
gives  the  example  of  his  own  newspaper  which  is  no  longer  a 
publication of a restricted community but that of a larger community 
of Turks.
15  
The  members  of  Turkish-Muslim  organizations  like  Milli 
Görü , the Gülen group and Süleymancıs take part in the democratic 
civil society and even compete with each other, trying to increase their 
share in the pool of official subsidies offered for promoting integration 
and  multiculturalism.  This  competition  results  in  civil  activism 
beyond mosque organizations and increases participation of Turkish 
immigrants in public life. This shift from the mosque-centered Islam 
to  an  Islam  dispersed  in  the  larger  public  sphere  is  an  important 
development  in  the  Netherlands.  The  civil  activism  of  Turkish-
Muslims leads also to an increased consciousness about their need for 
an educated elite who can represent them in the public sphere. Hence 
many  Islamic  associations  offer  not  only  traditional  Koran  courses 
anymore, but also organize university students for helping younger 
students increase their success in the school.  
 
                                                 
14 The Zaman in Turkey has been in the last years the newspaper with the highest 
daily circulation (-+ 800.000). 
15 Personal communication on 11 June 2007, at the building of Time Media Group in 
Rotterdam.  
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Official Islam in the Netherlands 
The  state-Islam of the PRA entered the scene only in the late 
1970s, after Süleymancı, MG, and Nurcu communities had already 
been  active  in  the  Netherlands.  Seventeen  mosque  organizations 
founded  the  TICF  (Turkish  Islamic  Cultural  Federation,  Stichting 
Turks-Islamitische  Culturele  Federatie)  in  1979  with  the  aim  of 
responding to the demands of the Turkish community for religious 
services by sustaining contacts with the PRA in Turkey (Van Bommel 
135; Avcı 207). Today, the TICF is the largest Turkish organization in 
the Netherlands with its 143 mosques (83 in the Rotterdam region, 60 
in the Deventer)
16 which work under the umbrella organization of the 
ISN  (Islamic  Foundation  Netherlands,  Islamitische  Stichting 
Nederland, Hollanda Diyanet Vakfı). The ISN was established in 1982 
to  deal  with  the  management  of  the  mosques.  These  mosques  are 
referred to as “Diyanet” mosques as these are all administered by the 
PRA (Diyanet) in Turkey, via the ISN. According to the statute of the 
ISN, the chairman of the association has to be the religious attaché 
who is appointed by the PRA and based at the Turkish Embassy in the 
Hague. The ISN fulfills the same function as the PRA and its civil 
organ,  Turkish  Diyanet  Foundation  (Türkiye  Diyanet  Vakfı)  in 
Turkey: It is active in building, maintaining and operating mosques 
and it employs imams, besides several activities such as organization 
of  religious  events  such  as  pilgrimage  to  Mecca,  burial  funds  or 
religious education) and several socio-cultural activities (Avcı 208). 
The  Diyanet  mosques  in  the  Netherlands  as  in  Turkey  and  other 
European  countries  aim  at  “promoting  and  consolidating  national 
solidarity and unity,” preventing the mobilization of Turkish citizens 
                                                 
16  The  list  of  the  mosques  can  be  seen  at  the  web  page  of  the  ISN: 
http://www.diyanet.nl.  
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along  the  religious  ideologies  opposing  the  secular  state,  and 
propagating a quietist Islam loyal to the Turkish state (Gözaydın 223; 
Landman 222-23).  
The PRA’s activity in the Netherlands is often framed as the 
Turkish  state’s  extension  of  the  control  of  Islamic  practice  even 
beyond the national borders (Waardenburg 23). Not surprisingly, the 
leadership  of  the  ISN,  frames  the  abroad  services  of  the  PRA  as 
beneficial for the peace and democracy in Europe as the PRA aims to 
keep immigrants away from Islamic radicalism. The chairman of the 
ISN,  Fevzi  Hamurcu,  defines  the  Diyanet  as  the  only  Islamic 
institution in the Netherlands which adopted secularism.
17 He argues 
that the backing of the Turkish state gives immigrants a feeling of 
confidence, as the Diyanet imams are financed by the state and not 
any  other  private  initiative.  Hasan  Güney,  the  chair  of  the  Mimar 
Sinan  Mosque  Association  in  Leiden  and  one  of  the  founding 
members of the ISN in the early 1980s affirms this view. Güney also 
adds that the state-financed imams contributed to the public order and 
security  as  these  could  be  neutral  arbiters  solving  intra-community 
quarrels and restricting (if not bringing an end to) common activities 
such as gambling and the consumption of alcohol.
18 Similarly, Arif 
Baran, board member of another Diyanet mosque (Ahi Evran Mosque 
in The Hague), thinks that the ISN is the only institution which can 
address the people’s needs.
19 These local representatives of the ISN 
describe it as the only trustworthy and neutral roof organization which 
provides the mosques which they built with their own civil initiative 
with religious services and qualified imams. 
                                                 
17 Personal communication on 12 June 2008 at the main office of the ISN in The 
Hague.  
18 Personal communication on 8 June 2008, Leiden. 
19 Personal communication on 7 June 2008, in The Hague.  
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The Diyanet mosques have not been perceived by the Dutch 
authorities as positively as these representatives of the ISN. The fact 
that imams appointed by the PRA in Turkey for 3 to 4 years have no 
connection with the Dutch society leads to the perception of these 
imams as obstacles to integration. To respond to this concern of the 
Dutch authorities, the ISN began to offer a 3-months long intensive 
language and adaptation course (in cooperation with Albeda College 
in Rotterdam) in 2006 in order to prepare the new imams for the new 
problems they can experience.
20 These courses educate the imams on 
the social and political situation in the country and also teach them the 
politically  and  culturally  correct  ways  of  doing  things  in  the 
Netherlands.  The  basic  language  they  learn  during  this  course 
facilitates their daily conduct though it is not sufficient for preaching. 
As observed by van Bruinessen, in the Netherlands, because 
of the “tradition of moral leadership by church ministers, there has 
been  a  tendency  to  perceive  imams  as  Muslim  ministers  and  to 
attribute to them pastoral functions that they never had in the countries 
of origin. They were often considered to be the most appropriate and 
representative spokespersons for their communities (or even for all 
Turks, all Moroccans, etc.), and became favorite targets for programs 
aiming  at  the  integration  of  Muslims”  (Van  Bruinessen).  The 
experience of an imam employed in a Diyanet mosque in Amsterdam, 
illustrated below, proves how limited this perception of the imams is. 
 
 
                                                 
20 As a precaution for preventing the imams and other spiritual leaders recruited in 
Islamic countries from being barrier to integration, Dutch authorities require (since 
2002) all imams and other religious leaders to complete a year-long language and 
integration course on basic understanding of Dutch social norms and values before 
they are allowed to practice in the Netherlands (Euro-Islam 2007-2008, 6; Dassetto 
144).  
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An Imam in Amsterdam 
As explained by Ahmet, the pseudonym that I give him to 
preserve  his  anonymity,  the  mosque  in  the  Dutch  context  is  only 
indirectly  within  the  bureaucracy  of  the  Turkish  PRA.
21  The  real 
authority  at  a  mosque  in  the  Netherlands  is  not  the  imam  but  the 
mosque committee consisting of nine - usually first generation- men. 
The imam leads the worship besides giving Koranic text-reading and 
religious knowledge courses to children and working as a spiritual 
advisor if necessary. His role often is that of psychological advisor 
especially on Fridays when many more people gather in the mosque. 
While  an  imam  is  a  state  employee,  the  board  of  the  mosque 
association consists of civil volunteers who take care of the building 
and organize other religious services offered by the ISN. The imam 
who officially works under his superior, the religious attaché in the 
Hague,  is  in  practice  working  together  with  this  board  trying  to 
establish good conducts with its members and the mosque community.  
As  a  state  official,  Ahmet  has  limited  liberty  compared  to 
imams in other community mosques who can talk about politics and 
often take a critical position vis-à-vis the Turkish state. Besides, his 
critical messages about Dutch politics can lead to a diplomatic scandal 
as he is directly under the supervision of the attaché seated at the 
Turkish Embassy. This neutral position and lack of “political mission” 
decreases  the  attractiveness  of  the  Diyanet  mosques  for  many 
immigrants. However, this situation also has its advantages. In other 
community mosques, imams are free to express their political views as 
long  as  they  remain  within  the  ideological  framework  of  their 
community. However, the imam’s position is even more at stake as he 
is totally dependent on the community as his financial source. Diyanet 
                                                 
21 Personal communication on 6 and 15 June 2008, Amsterdam.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Islam And Turkısh Immıgrants In The Netherlands              157                    
 
 
Turkish Studies 
International Periodical For the Languages, Literature  
and History of Turkish or Turkic   
Volume 3/7 Fall 2008 
 
 
imams,  like  Ahmet  however,  on  the  other  hand,  are  financially 
independent  from  the  community.  Besides,  their  independent  and 
relatively neutral position vis-à-vis the community gives confidence to 
those immigrants who see the mosque only as a worshiping place. An 
imam  from  among  the  community  would  never  be  respected,  says 
Ahmet, as he would always have opponents to his leadership.  
Ahmet’s experience as an imam in Amsterdam shows that an 
imam’s role is limited by the power structure in which he operates. 
However, the removal of Turkish, along with other native languages 
as the second language course from the curriculum of primary schools 
in  the  Netherlands  seems  to  have  increased  the  importance  of  the 
imam in the eyes of the immigrants. Imams began to be seen even 
more important as they talk to children in Turkish during the Koran 
courses. This is true for all Turkish communities who have a concern 
on the issue of language. This concern is expressed by Yaramı , the 
director  of  the  Milli  Görü   Southern  Netherlands:  “Giving  up  our 
language  means  giving  up  our  selves,  our  very  existence.”
22  For 
Turkish-Muslims,  Islam  is  an  identity  which  keeps  them  different 
from the dominant culture; however, it is not a sufficient marker of 
identity vis-à-vis other Muslim minorities. As also observed by Sunier 
in  the  early  1990s,  Islam  functions  in  the  Dutch  setting  also  as  a 
source  of  ethnic  consciousness  and  reassertion  (Sunier,  Islam  and 
Ethnicity,  161). Again in the words of Yaramı , it is “the language 
which  carries  the  Islamic  culture”  that  Turkish-Muslims  try  to 
preserve and transfer to their children. Hence, an imam of Moroccan 
or Dutch origin cannot satisfy their needs.  
                                                 
22  Personal  communication  on  13  June  2008  at  the  Đskender  Pa a  Mosque  in 
Rotterdam.  
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The main source which is used by Ahmet for preparing his 
sermons and preparing his advices is the official catechism prepared 
by  the  PRA.  However,  as  he  is  not  isolated  from  the  world 
surrounding him, he reads also several works which can enrich the 
content of his sermons. He is especially benefiting from the Koranic 
commentaries of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, the spiritual leader of the 
Nurcu movement, and the scientific explanations and stories offered in 
the  works  of  Harun  Yahya.
23  He  says  that  because  he  does  not 
mention the names of these authors, only a very limited number of 
literate audience can notice the sources of his stories. It is maybe here 
that the border between the state Islam and the parallel Islam  gets 
blurred. As long as the circulation of Islamic sources which constitute 
the basis of the parallel Islam are accessible to all, such a dichotomy is 
only on the surface. 
 
Conclusion 
A recent book on Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands and 
the  turkey-EU  relations,  coauthored  by  Veyis  Güngör,  the  current 
chairman  of  the  Dutch  branch  of  the  UETD  (Union  of  European 
Turkish Democrats),
24 is heralding the rise of “Euro-Turks” who are 
                                                 
23 The penname of Adnan Oktar (Ankara, 1956), who is known for his advocacy of 
creationism.  In  the  early  1980s,  he  gathered  around  himself  young  students  from 
prominent families of Istanbul which had a high economic status. In 1990, he founded 
the Scientific Research Foundation (SRF, or, in Turkish, Bilim Ara tırma Vakfı, or 
BAV) which publishes Oktar’s books (the most famous of which is The Evolution 
Deceit,  London:  Ta-Ha  Publishers,  1999)  and  brochures  and  distributes  them 
throughout Turkey, Europe and the United States.  
24 UETD, which has its branches in nine centers in Europe, states its mission as “to 
assure the integration of the Turks of Europe into European society while preserving 
their  own  identity.”  http://www.uetd-
brussels.eu/index.php?act=show&code=page&id=72&id_page=15&resume=0.  It  is 
also  lobbying  support  for  the  democratic  struggle  of  the  JDP  vis-à-vis  a  possible 
military-backed judicial coup in Turkey. See the joint proclamation of Turkish NGOs 
and local politicians in support of the JDP which is also signed by the UETD on 19  
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not blue-collar workers like their fathers but white-collar workers with 
better status and income, seeing their future in the Netherlands rather 
than in Turkey (27). We can see the young leaders of the Turkish-
Islamic organizations in the Netherlands, such as Süleymancıs, Milli 
Görü  and the Gülen group, as such Euro-Turks who are willing to be 
equal partners in the public life in the Netherlands without loosing 
their identity. It is important to note that the latter is a Turkish-Muslim 
identity  which  is  being  constructed  in  the  specific  context  of  the 
Netherlands.  These  Euro-Turks  construct  their  Turkish-Muslim 
identity at different levels in relation to three different groups: the 
non-Muslim  majority;  Muslims  of  different  ethnic  origins  such  as 
Moroccans; and other Turkish-Muslim communities which continue 
to reflect the old political and ideological cleavages in Turkey. This 
web of relationships allow them to adopt an Islamic perspective which 
appreciates  the  democratic  values,  recognize  the  plurality  of  Islam 
both in Turkey  and the  Netherlands,  and  resist  attempts  to  portray 
Muslims as a homogenous whole.  
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